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Introduction 
In this chapter we present an economic framework to revisit and reframe some important 
debates over the nature of free versus unfree labor and the economic consequences of 
emancipation.  We use a simple general equilibrium model in which labor can be either 
free or coerced and where land and labor will be exchanged on markets that can be 
competitive or manipulated or via other non-market collusive arrangements. 1   By 
working with variants of the same basic model under different assumptions about initial 
economy-wide factor endowments and asset ownership we can compare equilibrium 
distributional outcomes under different institutional and contractual arrangements 
including markets with free labor and free tenancy, slavery, and tenancy arrangements 
with tied labor-service obligations.  This last type of arrangement has been ubiquitous 
throughout history (Morner 1970) and we argue was central to the organization of 
production under serfdom. Even today labor tying is seen in many regions of the 
developing world and a careful analysis of this case provides important clues for 
understanding the nature of other voluntary yet servile labor arrangements including 
several forms of bonded labor.  
Analysis of these different contractual and organizational forms yields insights that 
accord with common sense, but that are often overlooked or downplayed in academic 
debates, particularly amongst economists.  Three insights are particularly important.  
First, landlords at times forego an opportunity to enslave peasants.  This may happen 
when peasants need incentives to apply certain talents and skills to productive tasks.  
Second, landlords often have the means and motive to collude to limit employees outside 
opportunities.  We show how landlords’ efforts to structure land and labor contracts as a 
complex bundle of tied or linked contracts may be an essential element of such a strategy. 
Landlords’ frequent insistence in such contexts that labor be ‘servile’ works for similar 
reasons. Third, state-led efforts to ‘emancipate’ workers by banning voluntary or 
involuntary tied-labor contracts may raise laborers’ incomes but may also drive landlords 
to reach for other less effective but more distorting market manipulation mechanisms that 
can lower total output and continue to severely cap the growth of peasant incomes.   
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These insights contrast with conventional wisdoms from both the modern and 
classical liberal traditions.  Modern liberal thinkers hold that too much power in the 
hands of a few might lead inevitably to coercion, and forget that coercion has an 
opportunity cost.  The powerful may sometimes be more interested in managing the 
choices of free laborers than compelling labor from a reluctant slave or serf.  Likewise, 
ending coercive relationships may improve by little the welfare of those formerly 
coerced, as landowners have at their disposal techniques for extracting value from freed 
laborers. Classical liberal thought holds that voluntary transactions must be welfare 
improving, and often downplays the importance of market manipulation and collusion in 
restricting the set of transactions available by assuming that collusion is fragile and will 
be undermined by competition.  Yet banning the voluntary linked contract-- forbidding a 
certain kind of freedom to contract – can raise peasant incomes by making collusion more 
difficult.  Much like Adam Smith, then, the analysis presented here suggests that an 
embrace of freedom of contract should be tempered by an appreciation of the importance 
of guaranteeing self-ownership and ensuring competition.  
The chapter is a frank exercise in persuasion armed by these three insights.  Our 
reading of the literature on unfree labor and emancipation is that it has been dominated 
by two purported paradoxes; a paradox of immiserizing emancipation and a paradox of 
immiserizing bans on freedom.2  Together, of course, they form a double paradox: the 
first suggests that people may become materially worse off when freed to sell their own 
labor, the second says they are better off without restrictions on their freedom to sell their 
labor.  Elements of both of these paradoxes are evoked in another chapter of this book by 
Stanley Engerman (2003) in which he first agrees with Amartya Sen that a ban on certain 
forms of bondage can at the same time expand both freedom and material welfare of 
laborers but later cautions that at other times “freedom [has] meant a lowering of material 
well-being, and living conditions of ex-slaves (p. 204),” and that “[t]here are conditions, 
generally at low levels of income, where tradeoffs between such freedoms might become 
necessary (p. 204).”   
Our effort here is to suggest that these paradoxes, while certainly valid, nonetheless 
sometimes miss the larger picture.   In many post-abolition situations (that is, where 
coerced labor is forbidden) poor laborers might be offered, and might accept, contracts 
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that tie land rental to labor service.  While these voluntary contracts have the potential to 
enhance efficiency and may be individually rational to accept as has so often been 
stressed in the literature on ‘interlinked-contracts’ (Braverman and Stiglitz 1982; Bardhan 
1989), we argue that once general-equilibrium interactions are considered, these contracts 
may paradoxically reduce welfare for laborers as a class.  That is because tied contracts 
can act as a barrier to competition, limiting peasants’ outside opportunities and therefore 
increasing the share of output that landlords can extract out of voluntary relationships. In 
our model tied contracts or ‘servility’ are ‘necessary’ only as a strategy to help landlords 
sustain a collusive arrangement to pay workers wages below their marginal product and 
not because laborers are poor.  This can be seen by noting that an equally efficient (but 
less favorable to landlords) allocation of resources can always be sustained via 
competitive factor markets without the need for any tying.    
  Before examining the details of the model framework, the next section places our 
analysis within a broader academic literature on unfree labor.  This section reviews some 
of the arguments that have been made for why the material well-being of unfree laborers 
might fall following emancipation and why a ban on bonded labor and other forms of 
voluntary servitude could also do more harm than good.  We turn then to the presentation 
of a simple general equilibrium model designed to pinpoint how different institutions of 
unfree labor might emerge as factor endowments, technology and distribution of 
resources in an economy change. A final section concludes.  
Debates over unfree labor 
Free and unfree persons are quite different.  Even in very poor societies, free persons are 
typically able to choose their place of residence, seek work with more than one employer, 
accumulate property, and seek credit and insurance from the most favorable source.  
They can also make choices about whether to sleep late, chat the morning away, enjoy or 
refuse the company of others if they so desire, and consume unhealthy beverages during 
breaks from work.  Unfree laborers rarely enjoy these freedoms except in stolen moments 
or at the whim and discretion of their masters or employers.   
Unfree persons are those persons constrained by forced labor arrangements such as 
slavery or serfdom, or by ‘voluntary’ but servile labor relationships such as indentured or 
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debt-bonded labor.  Persons in these various categories have lost part of the everyday 
control over time and body that is so characteristic of the free person.  Often with the 
explicit sanction of laws and societal norms these individuals have found their 
opportunities for advancement sharply limited by the obligation to remain at the constant 
beck and call of their masters or employers.  Even today, according to a 2005 ILO report, 
as many as 12.3 million people worldwide remain trapped in unfree labor relationships.  
Unfreedom in the form of a forced labor arrangement is easy to define and to 
condemn, where constraints have resulted from the use of force or from obvious deceit or 
illegality.   Since 1930 the ILO has defined the term forced labor by treaty as “work or 
service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which 
the said person has not offered himself voluntarily.”  Few today would disagree that such 
practices ought to be banned and violations ought to be rigorously enforced.    
Yet many commentators argue that seemingly forced and servile forms of labor 
should not be so quickly and comprehensively condemned and banned.  They fear that 
over-zealous reformers might prevent poor workers from entering into long-term 
arrangements that improve their welfare.   
The argument for caution has two components.  The first is that banning a voluntary 
and hence mutually agreeable arrangement may reduce well-being.  Arrangements 
entered into voluntarily, by revealed preference, mean that the individual who chose the 
relationship must have been choosing something that improved their situation.  
Circumstances make the person poorly off; the arrangement makes them better off.  This 
argument is used frequently in discussions of child labor, where the benevolent parent 
chooses between two bad options: commit the child to a servile labor relationship or 
suffer the possible long-term harm of not being able to furnish the child with adequate 
nutrition (Basu 1999).  The policy implications of this analysis are few for, as a very 
recent economics survey of the topic concluded “[w]hether anything other than economic 
development is an effective, long-term solution to the widespread incidence of child labor 
is an open question (Edmonds and Nina 2005).” 
This first component is taken to be self-evident by many economists, who often 
dismiss the argument that persons have to be “forced to be free” by a benevolent and wise 
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polity.  Negligible is the possibility that people make systematic mistakes, or might act 
again their long-term or objective interests as one of their many irrational selves out-
maneuvers the more rational selves.   A voluntary agreement is always a meeting of 
reasonable and rational minds, in this view, and arguments to the contrary have a whiff of 
“moral fastidiousness” about them (Krugman 1997).  If we respect the dignity of each 
human, should we not also respect his or her choices? 
Yet, as shown below, a new literature on the “paradox of bans” suggests that bans 
on contracts that are Pareto-improvements at the bilateral level may be paradoxically 
improving of welfare at the general equilibrium level.  This literature is a new and 
interesting application of the theory of multiple-equilibria and second-best arguments 
that, in the absence of complete markets, further limits on the set of incomplete markets 
can, in theory, improve well-being.   
The second component of the argument for caution examines and theorizes present 
and past economies, suggesting they may not involve coercion.  In this view historical 
and present-day arrangements such as serfdom, sharecropping, labor-service tenancy, and 
other ‘tied’ labor arrangements are not self-evidently the result of the application of force 
by the employer, as some have claimed.  Rather, these may perhaps be contractual 
adaptations that help individuals sustain commitments in a milieu were asymmetric 
information, costly enforcement and the absence of effective and impartial courts make 
commitments difficult or costly to sustain.   
Hundreds of thousands of poor European migrants, for example, used indentured 
servitude contacts to finance their passage to the Americas in the 17th and 18th centuries 
(Bush 2000; Galenson 1984).  Often after five years of service the indentured servant 
earned his ‘freedom dues’ and became a settler and possible property owner.  These poor 
Europeans did not possess sufficient resources to finance the voyage and purchase land 
and did not have collateral to assure a lender of compensation in the event of default. 
Given the distances and arduous passage, and the ease of movement to an ever-expanding 
frontier, lenders had reason to fear that loans would not be repaid.  In this environment, 
voluntary relinquishment of rights for a temporary period of time seemed quite 
reasonable; a lender could sell the loan to an employer in the New World who might then 
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collect repayment out of wages.  The penal code helped enforce these contracts.  A ban 
on indentured servitude would then have made the poor European workers who could not 
afford the voyage, worse off.   Studies by Bauer (1979) and Knight (1986) of debt-
bonding in Latin American agriculture, and larger comparative surveys by Northrup 
(1995) and Bush (2000) each emphasize the ways in which these contracts often 
responded to migrants’ and peasant farmers’ economic demands and often led to their 
advancement, even if they do agree that abuses did often occur.  
In a similar vein, North and Thomas (1973) saw serfdom emerging as a contractual 
arrangement that exchanged “labor services in return for the lord’s protection (p.20)” and 
other public goods in a dangerous world.  They rationalized the labor service component 
of these contracts as a substitution for money rents in an incompletely monetized 
economy.    
While discussions on indentured servitude and serfdom have been broadly empirical 
in approach, a related debate of labor tenancy has been largely theoretical.  The issue has 
been to show that situations where tenants receive a plot of land but in addition to rent 
must deliver a labor-service obligation may be explicable as voluntary contracts rather 
than as examples of forced exploitation.  The basic argument is that in a world of 
asymmetric information (or ‘transactions costs’ in earlier parlance) bonding and tying 
may emerge as devices to help contracting parties to enforce commitments to expand 
trade, and therefore to expand the size of the economic pie.   
Each part of the argument for caution in public action with regards to servile labor 
arrangements- that voluntary arrangements are welfare improving and that many labor 
arrangements are more likely to be voluntary than previously thought- resonates with an 
extensive corpus of writing on the subject.  But the argument for caution also has its 
zones of contention.  The theoretical argumentation relies on particular assumptions, and 
the major purpose of this paper is to show that under other reasonable assumptions some 
of the intuitions of the argument for caution in public action may be unwarranted. 
Likewise, empirical approaches rely on selective presentation of facts and statistics.  
Finding exceptional cases of voluntary servitude might obscure the more important fact 
of involuntary servitude.  There is no shortage of reliable accounts of how persons have 
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been threatened with bodily harm were they not to ‘consent’ to an involuntary labor bond 
(Bales 2000). The threats sometimes emerge in the course of deliberate raids to capture 
labor, and sometimes as a judicially sanctioned punishment for failure to repay as debt.  
Sometimes children are rendered into the status of unfree labor as compensation or 
punishment for unpaid debts of the parents.  In the same vein, commenting on North and 
Thomas’ interpretation of serfdom as an efficiency enhancing contractual exchange of 
tribute for protection and other public goods historian Robert Brenner (1996) has half-
seriously agreed by comparing the services rendered by lords to those of a protection 
racket- serfs were given a contract they could not refuse.   
A model of labor and tenancy 
The following pages analyze variants of a simple general equilibrium model of an 
agrarian economy, modified and extended to focus attention on the interacting roles of 
factor endowments, technology, and the initial distribution of assets.  These shape 
opportunities and incentives that elites have to use extra-economic coercion and market 
power to generate patterns of agrarian organization and distribution to their advantage.  
The framework is meant to be general enough to nest and allow for comparisons across 
several alternative institutional arrangements including the standard textbook model of 
competitive and efficient land and labor markets, an economy with slavery, economies 
with both voluntary and involuntary tied labor-service contracts, and an economy where 
large landowners withhold land from the lease market, giving rise to a ‘latifundia-
minifundia’ agrarian structure. 
This framework will permit a quick tour of several hypotheses and debates that have 
engaged political economists, economists, and historians for a long time.  For example, 
we will state and analyze the Nieboer/Domar hypothesis on the causes of slavery or 
serfdom and mention some elements of the critique that Robert Brenner and others 
offered of this and other neo-classical demographic hypothesis (Aston and Philpin 1985).  
The model also provides a framework for understanding debates concerning the 
economic and political consequences of emancipation and the nature of the transitions or 
“paths” toward more free and competitive land and labor contracts (Byres 1996; de 
Janvry 1981). 
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We begin with an economy that has 100T = units of land.  There are 2M =  
identical landlord households that together own 80 percent (θ=0.8) of the total land area, 
or 40 units of land each. There are also 80N =  peasant households that together own (or 
have customary property rights to) the remaining 20 percent of the land mass, or 0.25 
units per household.  Each peasant household owns H=1.25 units of household labor and 
we assume landlords do not supply manual labor.  The total labor force consists therefore 
of 100L N H= ⋅ =  units of labor and the overall land-to-labor ratio is / 1t T L= = units of 
land per laborer. 
Landlord and peasant households have knowledge of the same crop production 
technology that would allow them to produce a staple agricultural product sold at unit 
price set by world markets.  In our first scenario however we assume that landlords begin 
with a higher initial endowment of non-traded farm management skills. Farm production 
technology is summarized by a standard constant-returns-to-scale (CRS) Cobb-Douglas 
production function 1q T L Sα β α β− −=  where T and L are land and labor farm inputs and S 
is the household’s non-traded level of farming skill or labor supervision ability.     By 
normalizing the peasant’s endowment of factor S to Sp = 1, we can represent the peasant’s 
technology more compactly by the restricted production function ( , )F T L T Lα β=  which 
has decreasing returns to scale in land and labor input as long as S plays any significant 
role in production (i.e. as long as 0α β+ < ).  The importance of non-traded skills in 
agricultural production is widely and used to explain the lasting prevalence of family 
farming and tenancy in many contexts (Hayami and Otsuka 1993). 
Landlords employ the same production technology but have a larger endowment of 
the non-traded input, 1rS > . The landlord’s technology can then be represented as 
( , ) ( , )G T L A F T L= ⋅  where (1 )rA S α β− −= .  Intuitively, the landlord’s assumed higher 
level of managerial skill can be thought of as raising the productivity of the land and 
labor inputs in the restricted farm production function.  For the simulations below we 
shall assume α = 0.45, β=0.45 and that landlords start with 10rS = , or ten times more of 
the non-traded factor compared to a peasant household.3  
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If land and labor markets are allowed to be fully competitive then households will 
allocate their own factor inputs and hire in or hire out land and labor until the marginal 
value product of each factor is equalized to a common market land rental or labor wage.  
Suppose the efficient equilibrium level of peasant land and labor use is denoted ( , )e ep pT L . 
The equilibrium level of input use can be easily deduced by noting that the equalization 
of marginal value products across farms implies that farms will operate using the same 
factor proportions (i.e. same land-to-labor, skill-to-land, and skill-to-labor ratios). Since 
landlords have Sr = 10 times more management skill in an efficient equilibrium they must 
also operate using 10 times more land and labor compared to peasant farms. In 
equilibrium labor demand from the M landlord farms ( 10 )e er p pM S L L⋅ ⋅ =  plus the labor 
demand from the N peasant farms ( 80 )e ep pN L L⋅ =  must add up to the economy’s total 
labor supply ( 100)L = .  From this (and applying similar reasoning to the land market) it 
is easily calculated that  
 1ep
r
LL
M S N
= =⋅ +  (0.1) 
 1ep
r
TT
M S N
= =⋅ +  (0.2) 
Hence in the competitive economy each of the 80 peasant households would operate a 
farm with one unit land and one unit of labor, while each of the two landlord households 
would run a larger farm with 10 units of land and labor.  
Given the assumed distribution of ownership over land and labor, we could view this 
equilibrium as consisting of each landlord leasing out 30 units of land (0.75 units of land 
to each of 40 sub-tenants) while operating their own demesne or plantation on the 
remaining 10 units of land using in 10 units of labor by hiring 0.25 units of labor from 
each of 40 households.  
Note that the competitive equilibrium distribution of operational farm sizes is 
unique and is determined independent of the initial distribution of land or labor 
ownership. Operational farm sizes are affected only by the distribution of non-traded 
factors and by the overall land to labor ratio.  Market factor prices, equal to marginal 
products, are easily calculated to be  
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( ,1)
( ,1)
(1 )
L
T
w F t t
r F t t
t
α
α
α
β
α
π α β
−
⎡ ⎤= = ⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤= = ⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤= − − ⎣ ⎦
 (0.3) 
where w, r and π are, respectively the market wage and rental rates and the shadow price 
of a unit of non-traded S.  This last quantity is also the value of peasant farm profits.  The 
wage rate w increases monotonically with t  as labor becomes relatively more scarce (or, 
what is the same thing, as land becomes more abundant) while the competitive land 
market rental rate falls.   Total income to household g is given by the sum of farm profits 
plus factor sales: 
 ( ,1) ( ,1) 1 g gg gt S F t rt w wL rT⎡ ⎤Π = − − + +⎣ ⎦  (0.4) 
At the initial land-to-labor labor ratio of 1t = , landlords in our simulated economy will 
be essentially rentiers, deriving 95 percent of their income, or 19 units, from their 40 
units of land valued at the market rental rate 0.45r = , and only 1 unit of income from 
farm profits.   
Since all farms face a common market wage, a peasant laborer should be, on the 
margin, indifferent between working another hour for a landlord or on their own farm or 
tenancy.  This implies that there should be no compelling reason for any party to tie labor 
and tenancy contracts.  Some peasants might of course rent from and work for the same 
landlord, but this would just be by chance.  Landlords might want to clock their laborers 
hours on the job (one could perhaps interpret S as a required input into this monitoring 
process), but a landlord should not care about what any given laborer does on their own 
family farm or tenancy. This is because each hour of work that that laborer withdraws 
from the landlord can be easily and immediately replaced by hiring another laborer at the 
same spot market wage. 
Labor scarcity and coerced labor: the Nieboer/Domar 
Hypothesis 
Suppose that due to discovery or conquest the economy’s land endowment is now 
expanded from 100 to 100T >  units while the labor force remains constant at 100L = . 
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Assume furthermore that it is either the peasant households, or some third party such as 
the government or a previously non-landowning military service class that establishes 
property rights on the newly expanded land frontier.  We assume this third party does not 
have the required skill to operate a farm themselves so they will simply turn around and 
rent out (or sell) any newly acquired land to existing landlord and peasant farmers at the 
new competitive market rental rate.  
A new efficient equilibrium might emerge where every existing household 
production unit with farming ability S expands its use of land proportionately to absorb 
the economy’s increased acreage.  Since the labor supply has not increased, each farm 
employs as many labor units as before (one unit per operational farm unit).  From (0.3) 
and intuition it should be clear that the higher land to labor ratio /t T L=   leads to higher 
equilibrium labor market wages and farm profits and lower land rental rates.  Unless the 
original M landlords are able to appropriate significant amount of this frontier land for 
themselves at below market prices, their total incomes rΠ will decline. The red line in 
Error! Reference source not found. indicates how the income to a landlord who owns 
40 units of land falls as a function of the economy’s land to labor ratio t  in this 
parameterized example. 
[Error! Reference source not found. about here] 
A well known economic explanation of the rise and fall of coerced labor systems is 
Evsy Domar's 1970 essay “On the Causes of Slavery or Serfdom: A Hypothesis.”  
Building on earlier ideas by H.J. Nieboer (1910) and descriptions by V.O. Kliuchevsky 
(1968) of imposition of Russian serfdom in the 16th-century after the great expansion 
into the steppes, Domar conjectured that coerced labor arrangements were most likely to 
emerge in economies where labor became scarce relative to land precisely for the reason 
just seen: – in such an economy expanding incomes would accrue to those who controlled 
labor rather than land.   Hence Domar wrote that as, “the central areas of the [Russian] 
state became depopulated because of peasant migration into the newly conquered areas in 
the east and southeast,” serfdom emerged, “under the pressure of the serving [landlord] 
class...[as] the government gradually restricted the freedom of peasants ... to move.”  In a 
review of competing hypotheses, Kolchin (1987) concludes that Domar’s intuition 
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probably “was the most basic element” behind the rise of slavery and serfdom in several 
important cases including Russia and the slave labor plantations in the Americas and the 
US South.    
Domar was however not very clear about the nature of the difference between 
slavery and serfdom, or about how technology or the initial distribution of property rights 
over land might shape these institutional transformations, but the model of this chapter 
can be adapted to probe some of these issues in further depth.  For the sake of brevity and 
clarity we begin by modeling the imposition of slavery in an extremely simple way.  We 
later extend the model to allow for a richer pattern of voluntary and involuntary 
contracting relationships involving both land and labor, which we shall argue, provides a 
better characterization of the kind of serfdom that Domar was describing.   
Consider the following first crude way of modeling a slave economy.  Suppose that 
landlords can, as a result of campaign of violence and intimidation, kidnap half the 
existing peasant population and compel them to supply their labor at a subsistence wage 
w per unit.  We assume that the new slave owner can compel a slave to provide manual 
labor but the slave owner cannot compel the slave to supply non-traded farming skill, 
although we will in a moment consider how elites might try to recruit that resource as 
well.   
Although this economy clearly violates slaves’ rights, we shall assume that property 
rights over slaves are secured and tradable and that both land and labor are transacted on 
competitive markets. The competitive renting or selling of slave labor was commonplace 
in many slave economies such as that of the southern United States.  To simplify, slave 
labor and free labor are assumed to be perfect substitutes in production so that an hour of 
slave labor will trade on the market at the same market wage w.  Given these 
assumptions, the principal (but not the only) difference between this slave economy and 
the earlier described competitive equilibrium with free land and labor contracting lies in 
the distribution of property rights over labor.   
Total landlord income is, as before, given by the sum of farm profits plus factor 
market sales: 
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( , ) ( )s s s s r rr r r rG T L r T w L rT w w L⎡ ⎤− ⋅ − ⋅ + + −⎣ ⎦  
The latter includes the ‘exploitation rents’ the slave owner receives from expropriating w 
worth of labor services from each unit of slave labor but paying each slave only w for 
those services.  In our numerical example each landlord now owns 10 slave households, 
or 12.5 (=10*1.25) units of slave labor.   
Landlords face a tradeoff in choosing between a slave and a free labor and tenancy 
economy.  Domar and Nieboer focused on the direct costs of enslaving and maintaining 
coercion, which could be significant.  If these costs were low, though, it might seem that 
landlords could only gain by enslaving a fraction of the population.  Landlords in essence 
simply steal and reap the rewards from owning somebody else’s labor. 
There is another tradeoff, though, apparently not considered by either Domar or 
Nieboer.  It arises because equilibrium land rents may fall due to the shrinking number of 
peasant producers putting their non-traded skills to efficient use.  Even if slaves had been 
imported from outside of the economy, a landowner must always ask themselves whether 
they could earn more by continuing to use unskilled workers as slaves on a plantation or 
instead transform those workers into tenants or serfs so as to extract some of the returns 
the economy enjoys from bringing the non-traded farming skills S that new peasant-
tenants would supply via higher land rents.    
This tradeoff is diagrammed in Error! Reference source not found. comparing 
landlord income under free tenancy and labor market arrangements (solid line) to that 
under a slave economy (dashed line) for different land-to-labor ratios.4  As computed 
with the parameters given above, landlords earn higher incomes in the free economy 
when the land-to-labor ratio is somewhere approximately below 1.25, but prefer the slave 
economy in more labor-scarce environments. This comparison does not net out the costs 
that slave owners might have to pay to coerce a slave labor force, nor does it consider the 
possibility that slave laborers could be either more or less productive than free laborers.5  
As drawn, landlord incomes at first fall but later rise as the land-labor ratio increases.  
This reflects the tug of war between falling income from land rents and rising income 
from owning slaves.   
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The dispossession and enslavement of half of the peasant population means that land 
and labor that these households had employed in a free economy are now put on the 
market for the remaining production units to absorb.  In the new ‘efficient’ equilibrium, 
the size of landlord farms and the remaining free farms must expand proportionately to 
absorb these resources, both wages and land rental rates must fall (factor productivity 
falls as less S is being used) and farm profits must rise (as S is now more scarce).  Total 
output would fall compared to an efficient free and competitive equilibrium. 6   
Independent farm producers who are not enslaved may either gain or lose from this 
change in factor prices, depending on the importance of wages and farm profits in total 
household income.  The political economy implications are rather interesting, as it 
suggests for example a reason why slavery would have been supported by white small 
farm producers in the U.S. South even if they did not own slaves—land and labor is now 
available at a lower rent and farm profits increase as farm management skills S has now 
been made a more scarce resource amongst the remaining free farmers.   
The roads to and from serfdom: tied labor contracts 
The Russian landlords and the Tsars did not establish slavery.  What instead occurred 
was the slow but steady growth of legislation over the course of the 16th and 17th 
centuries that made it increasingly more difficult for laborers to move from one landlord 
to another.  This transformed existing modes of ‘voluntary’ tied labor contracting 
including varied forms of ‘voluntary’ bondage, ‘self-pledging’ and labor-service tenancy 
into the involuntary tied arrangements that came to constitute Russia’s new serfdom 
(Kliuchevsky 1968; Kolchin 1987).   
Conversely, when centuries later the Russian Tsar abolished serfdom by decree in 
1861, or when slavery was abolished in the sugar economies of the Americas and the 
U.S. South, these economies did not snap into new competitive tenancy and labor 
markets of textbook analysis.  Instead, in almost all cases these societies transitioned to 
economies where indenture, debt-bonding and varied forms of labor-service tenancy 
emerged.    
Our model provides a simple explanation for the widespread use of voluntary, tied 
labor contracting.  Tying labor can serve as a device to help landlords collude and 
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improve their ability to extract land monopoly and labor monopsony rents.  Collusion is 
difficult to sustain in practice because laborers will naturally seek higher returns by 
contracting outside of the collusive arrangement, or by more intensively utilizing 
whatever own or common property resources they have available.  Anticipating this, 
elites will seek to pre-empt these outside options and try to either limit labor mobility 
outright (in which case the system becomes involuntary serfdom) and try to strictly 
regulate peasant access to other resources and trading opportunities in the ‘free’ 
economy.  Hence, almost universally, we find elites in post-abolition societies rushing to 
sponsor anti-vagrancy laws, limits or prohibitions on the ability of freedmen to own land, 
to obtain credit, to move or settle in certain ‘white’ areas or frontiers, and in general 
discouraging peasant production through the imposition of taxes (Ransom and Sutch 
2001) (Binswanger, Deininger, and Feder 1995; Lundahl 1992).   
The question arises as to what determines whether an economy that bans coercion 
and abrogates restrictions on mobility will transition to the efficient competitive 
equilibrium described above, or to some other type of equilibrium.  Suppose slavery or 
serfdom were suddenly abolished.  To add a touch of realism, suppose also that the 
transition were somewhat disruptive so for a brief period households retreated to a semi-
autarkic equilibrium.  Recall that the ‘slave economy’ of the last section was privately 
profitable to the slave-owners but it was also inefficient in so far as slaves’ non-traded 
skills S were not being utilized.  Whether this efficiency cost is large or small depends on 
the importance of S in production and the extent to which S is held by slaves.   
Rather than allow the emergence of a competitive market where landlords have to 
compete for labor by offering the highest wage or for tenants by offering the lowest land 
rent, they would much prefer a more collusive arrangement.  Consider the following 
collusive contracting arrangement: landlords agree to divide up the peasant population 
equally amongst themselves and to not contract with each other’s peasants.  Each 
landlord then offers each peasant household a take-it-or-leave it contract with the 
following clauses: 
1. The landlord will lease epT t=  units of land (i.e. the efficient level described 
in the competitive equilibrium above) to a peasant in exchange for a lump-
sum rent or tribute payment R (value set as described below). 
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2. The lease is provided on condition that the tenant additionally agrees to 
supply 0.25 units of labor service to the landlord. 
3. The tenant shall not sublease or allow any other workers to work the land 
without the landlords’ explicit consent.   
To insure that the contract remains an entirely voluntary transaction for the peasant the 
landlord cannot set the tribute payment R above the tenant-laborer’s reservation utility.  
The peasant’s reservation utility depends on the availability of alternate contracting 
opportunities and their ownership of land (defined broadly to include customary land 
rights or access to common property areas).  If all other peasants in the economy are 
accepting similar contracts, then the only alternative to contracting with the landlord 
becomes to remain or retreat into autarkic (Chayanovian) production.  In either case, the 
most a peasant household can earn is what they could get from using their available land 
and labor endowment in our numeric example is 0.125pT =  and 1.25pL = , in home 
production to yield income ( , )p pF T L =0.434.7  To assure voluntary participation the 
tribute rent R must be chosen to make sure that the peasant earn slightly more from 
accepting than from rejecting the contract: 
F(t,1) F( , )p pR T L− ≥  
The colluding landlord therefore can set the rent/tribute payment as high as just below 
[F(t,1) F( , )]p pR T L= −  
or 0.434=0.566t
α⎡ ⎤ −⎣ ⎦  per tenant when 1t = .    
As long as landlords can sustain a collusive equilibrium, this set of voluntary tied 
labor-service contracts reproduces the efficient competitive production allocation exactly 
except that here landlords take a far larger share of total output.  Since each landlord 
contracts with 40 peasants, they earn a total income of  
 ( , ) 40r rG S t S R+  
or 32.65 in our numerical example when 1t = , which is well above the 19 units that they 
would earn under a competitive equilibrium in the same economy.    
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No doubt some economic historian many decades later looking back at the records 
left of these voluntary transactions would be led to proclaim that these contracts had all 
been ‘Pareto enhancing’ and therefore to the advantage of the peasants involved.  As 
evidence they would point to the certain fact that compared to what a subsistence peasant 
earned those ‘lucky’ to obtain these contracts were made better off.   While the logic of 
the arguments seems impeccable, the economic historian’s conclusions are in fact quite 
misleading in our example economy.  The historian’s problem here is not a failure of 
logic but one of imagination -- the failure to imagine the counterfactual of what the 
distribution of payoffs would look like in a truly competitive economy if landlords had to 
compete and every factor were paid its marginal product.   When this is the 
counterfactual, labor-service contracts can be instead interpreted as a strategy by 
landlords to limit competition and sustain collusion, and therefore something that 
immiserizes rather than improves peasant lives.   
It should also be obvious that, starting from the proposed collusive equilibrium, a 
peasant household with a labor-service tenancy contract would want to breach the 
contract and divert labor from the landlords’ demesne to his rental plot.  That is because 
his marginal return from extra labor on his own plot is ( ,1)TF t  compared to zero on the 
landlords’ farm where is labor is obligated.  If the application of labor time or effort 
could not be perfectly observed on the landlords’ farm, the situation would essentially 
become a classic principal-agent or moral hazard problem.  The landlord would complain 
that his peasants’ lacked a work ethic and were diverting resources to their individual 
plots rather than fulfilling their contractually agreed-upon legal obligations to provide 
labor service.  Landlords would also argue, again on seemingly very firm liberal grounds 
about the importance property rights and voluntary contract, that harsh penal codes and 
strict legal enforcement were important, not just for their own good, but so as to also help 
peasants to make the credible commitments necessary to enter into Pareto-improving 
trades.   
Without legal enforcement, the argument would go, landlords might have little 
choice but to respond to this situation of moral hazard by under-investing in agriculture 
and rationing peasants to smaller than efficient tenancies with a consequent fall in total 
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output.  This moral hazard problem is a very familiar one that has been at the center of 
important explanations of the choice of contract forms.  The crucial point to note here 
however is that the ‘problem’ emerges primarily as a consequence of the fact that 
landlords are trying to get away with paying labor a wage far below its marginal product.  
Since the wage for each extra hour of work on the landlords’ demesne is essentially zero, 
peasants are strongly tempted to cut back on an hour of labor service and divert that labor 
to their own tenancy where on the margin they earn ( ,1)TF t . A peasant therefore has 
strong incentives to feign sickness or find other ways to cut back on labor service hours 
under the collusive arrangement.8  There is no similarly strong incentive to avoid wage 
labor in a competitive economy because the marginal gain they earn by using that labor 
on their own farm would then be exactly offset by the wage ( ,1)Tw F t=  they lose by 
working an hour less for the landlord.   
Can this collusive equilibrium be sustained?  The terms of the contract themselves 
act as a barrier to competition for several reasons. Clearly stipulated and strictly enforced 
labor service obligations aim at stopping labor from being diverted to peasant plots as 
well as to other landlords.  In actual practice a way to control labor’s outside 
opportunities was to mark class differences and insist that the servant adopt a servile and 
deferential attitude and to remain attentive to the master’s every ‘beck and call.’ 
Although historians have sometimes sought to root such behaviors in cultural and 
military traditions, these obviously also served the useful economic purpose of limiting a 
peasant’s chances of discovering or utilizing outside ‘moonlighting’ opportunities.  
Similarly, the stipulation that the peasant not hire outsiders without the landlords’ explicit 
consent is aimed at making sure that a competing market for wage labor does not develop 
within the peasant sector.  Without this clause a peasant that refused to accept a labor-
service tenancy on the landlords’ terms might be able to find work as a laborer on another 
tenant’s plot (where the marginal product of their labor exceeds what landlords are 
offering as wages).   
The important point of this discussion has been that the ‘moral hazard problem’ and 
the attendant conflict that the landlord must work so hard to control is deeply rooted in 
the landlords’ attempts to sustain a collusive arrangement that pays demesne labor a wage 
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well below its marginal product (essentially zero in our simple example) and charges 
tenants tribute rent well above the shadow factor price of land.  If the collusion were 
broken and landlords were forced compete to hire in labor and lease out land at 
competitively determined factor prices then the ‘need’ to tie or to insist upon a servile 
labor force would disappear or be greatly reduced.9 
Even if the terms of labor service contracts could be perfectly enforced by ‘the law’, 
the collusive equilibrium could be undermined by competition between landlords. Since 
each contract is highly lucrative, landlords might be tempted to poach each other’s 
peasants by offering labor-service contracts with lower tribute R, or by simply hiring 
away workers at a wage.  Serfdom solved this problem by imposing lordly jurisdiction 
that strictly limited mobility and controlled and regulated peasants’ freedom to engage in 
activities that might divert labor or effort away from tasks that could be subjected to 
lordly taxation (Brenner 1996). 
Where laborers’ movement could not be perfectly limited through coercion 
landlords often found it convenient to employ the device of a credit advance to bring 
tenants under the purview of the law and penal codes to enforce the terms of labor 
service.  The voluntary contract above could be modified to provide the peasant with an 
up front credit advance, ostensibly to compensate the landlord for the cost of the 
peasant’s dwelling or perhaps ‘the cost of passage’ that the landlord has provided.  For 
example, prior to the imposition of involuntary servitude in Russia, peasants often ‘self-
pledged’ by accepting a loan backed by a promissory note in which they agreed to pay off 
their obligation  by serving the landlord as a servant or a labor service tenant 
(Kliuchevsky 1968).   It was not unusual for a contract to have a worker “serve for 
usury,” or in other words, work merely to pay off the accumulation of interest, leaving 
the level of the principal or the bond unchanged.  Any pledger who broke service or was 
declared insolvent by a court could be turned into a permanent bondsman who could then 
only be freed at their masters’ will, a condition of service that became hereditary.  These 
arrangements still remained ‘voluntary’ and contractual so long as the law generally 
allowed the peasant to ransom their freedom and, although only during officially 
sanctioned days of the year, to change employers.   
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This system of voluntary bonding evolved into bondage in perpetuity or involuntary 
serfdom over the course of the late 16th and 17th centuries as new laws were introduced 
that made it increasingly difficult for peasants to change employers or to ransom their 
freedom.  V.O. Kliuchevsky saw these restrictions as a landlord reaction to the conditions 
of “acute labor shortage” that developed as “masses of the peasantry” started to flee the 
central Russian provinces in search of land and opportunities in the newly expanded 
frontier (p.182).”10   
As this discussion suggests, the dividing line between voluntary and involuntary tied 
labor contracts has oftentimes been blurred.    Economists often assume that a ‘voluntary’ 
contract must, almost by definition, lead to improvements to the class of laborers who 
accepts them, yet as we have argued here this need not be the case once the possibility of 
landlord collusion and general equilibrium interactions are considered.    
   History is replete with other examples of laws and state action aimed at facilitating 
collusion amongst landlords to keep ‘voluntary’ labor arrangements from becoming too 
competitive (Binswanger, Deininger, and Feder 1995).  For instance, after the Thirteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution was adopted in 1865 banning involuntary servitude in the 
United States, southern legislatures rushed to immediately pass ‘Black Codes’ to limit 
freed slaves’ outside opportunities by making it more difficult for them to switch 
employers, own land, access forests and other common property resources, or even to 
remain idle.  This legislation was often quite naked in its obvious attempts to sustain 
collusive arrangements.  Consider the following excerpt of a law passed by the Louisiana 
Legislature in December 1865 as cited by Ransom and Sutch (2001) in their classic study 
of the post-bellum Southern economy. The legislation limited the ability to switch 
employers by requiring “all laborers to make contracts for the following year by January 
tenth” and by stipulating “that laborers leaving employers would forfeit all wages due 
them and could be imprisoned as alien against any alleged losses (p. 67).”  Just as 
importantly the law also threatened that anybody who should 
… entice away, feed, harbor, or secrete any person who leaves his or her employer 
… shall be liable for damages to the employer, and ... shall be subject to pay a fine 
of not … less than ten dollars, or imprisonment in the parish jail for not … less than 
ten days, or both.” 
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Even if such types of legislation have been by now generally taken off the books in 
many nations, servile labor and other forms of voluntary bondage (ILO 2005) still 
persists where local laws, customs and norms of behavior help sustain collusive 
arrangements that severely limit workers outside opportunities, often on the basis of race, 
caste, nationality, ethnic or gender differences.11   
Property rights, asset inequality and the paradoxes of bans  
Figure 2 is useful for summarizing and explaining how income and distribution 
change in our model economy under different institutional arrangements and initial 
distributions of property over land.  If overall factor endowments consist of 100 units of 
land and labor the efficient allocation of resources under our assumed technologies 
should yield a total of 100 units of output for the economy, regardless of the initial 
distribution of land.  This efficient potential level of income is indicated by the horizontal 
‘Total-efficient’ line passing through point E in the figure.  As we have argued, this could 
be achieved in principle either through competitive factor markets or via a collusive but 
‘efficient’ system of voluntary or involuntary tied labor-service contracts that extracts 
surplus from peasant households via lump sum tribute and labor service obligations.  The 
peasant household sector’s share of total output is obviously very different under these 
two alternative scenarios.  In a competitive market total peasant income  – given by the 
sum of farm profits plus the market value of factors owned – is indicated by the solid line 
labeled ‘Peasant – competitive’ passing through point C.  This has slope of minus the 
competitive rental rate on land r because the value of land owned by peasants declines as 
the fraction of total land owned by landlords θ increases.  Point C on the diagram 
indicates that when landlords own 80 percent of the land stock, the peasant sector 
nonetheless still takes home 62 percent of total income in the economy by virtue of their 
ownership of labor and other factors.12  
Under a collusive arrangement of tied contracts peasant incomes could in principle 
be pressed down to their autarky levels. That would leave the peasant sector earning just 
slightly more than they would from withdrawing from transactions with landlords and 
instead making use of their own land ( (1 ) /pT T Nθ= − ) and labor (H) resources.  This 
would earn them their Chayanovian farm income ( , )pF T H .  Point A indicates that at 
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θ=0.8 where the typical peasant household has access to 0.25pT =  units of land, this 
income would be (0.25,1.25) 47.4F = , which is considerably below their income with 
competitive markets.  The figure also shows that gap between competitive incomes and 
incomes in an economy with ‘tied contracts’ rises rapidly as initial land ownership 
becomes more concentrated in landlords’ hands.  This is because as θ rises peasants have 
ever smaller autarky plots and therefore worse and worse fall-back positions.   
Suppose the distribution of property rights were such that the economy was at 
collusive equilibrium A in the diagram.  The arrangement may have been sustained by 
limits on labor mobility.  Consider what might happen next if a newly emboldened state 
intervened to limit all forms of landlord coercion and lift all barriers to peasant mobility 
within the agrarian economy.  The State declares that existing property rights over land 
will be respected and enforced but that involuntary servitude and coercive barriers to 
peasant mobility are prohibitive.  The one and only interference with the freedom to 
contract is that tied voluntary labor-service obligation contracts will be effectively 
banned via the legal stipulations that all land and labor transactions must be remunerated 
at ‘market determined’ wages and rental rates.   Legislation of this sort has been common 
in Asia or Latin America as part of efforts to regulate or suppress bonded labor and labor-
service contracting arrangements.13  
Does a ban on tying lead to a quick transition to a new efficient competitive 
equilibrium at C with much higher peasant incomes or somewhere else?   Historical 
evidence suggests that the most common immediate outcome of slave and serf 
emancipation was the significant collapse of output in many societies (Bush 2000; de 
Castro 2000) and perhaps even a decline in some of the material conditions of the now 
free workers (Engerman 2003).   This question, on the nature the transition paths and the 
kinds of agrarian capitalism that may emerge following expansion into a new territory or 
the abolition of coerced labor and other forms of voluntary ‘servile’ labor, has been one 
that has vexed and exercised Marxist and non-Marxist historians for several generations 
(Byres 1996).  When does the economy follow an ‘American Road’ leading close to a 
Jeffersonian ideal in which production is dominated by family-farmers and very active 
and competitive land and labor markets, and when does it follow a ‘Prussian’ or ‘Latin 
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American’ road where production instead becomes dominated by wage labor plantation 
agriculture or Latifundia in which peasant incomes remain compressed and peasant 
production remains limited to small tenancies or minifundia. 
A simple extension of the model above suggests why the economy may very well 
not snap to a new competitive equilibrium, but rather settle on a distorted one with lower 
total output and only a scant improvement in peasant welfare.  The argument, which is 
laid out in some more detail in the appendix and in (Conning 2004) is that landlords’ 
reaction to a ban that deprives them of the use of tied-contracts as an efficient mechanism 
for surplus extraction, may be to turn to other privately profitable but socially inefficient 
mechanisms to earn rents.   
As discussed above, elites frequently acted to close down the outside income 
generating opportunities of their newly untied laborers using both legal and illegal means.  
Our argument here is that that landlords would likely also seek to limit peasants’ outside 
opportunities via economic market mechanisms, without the need for (but in practice 
very likely in addition to) this kind of extra-economic barrier building.14   
Suppose that following emancipation the economy temporarily moved to the 
competitive equilibrium indicated by C in Figure 2.   Starting from this efficient outcome, 
can landlords change resource allocations to raise their incomes?   If landlords control a 
large enough amount of land, the answer is they can.  Consider the simplest case where 
our M=2 landlords collude but cannot use tied contracts, so they must transact at ‘market’ 
wages and rental rates.15   As discussed previously, competitive landlords would be 
rentiers as the bulk of their income is from leasing out large amounts of land to tenants, 
and only secondarily from farm profits.   If in such a context landlords have enough land 
to be able to exploit market power they should limit the amount of land they lease to the 
market to push up land rents.  This is the classic partial-equilibrium argumentation for a 
monopoly markup on land rents.  But in this general equilibrium context there is an 
additional important effect that landlords must also consider.  Landlords maximize profits 
plus the value of owned land.  As they restrict land leased out they increase earnings from 
land but also end up pushing down the land to labor ratio in the peasant sector.  With less 
land to work with, the marginal product of labor declines on peasant farms leading 
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peasant households to optimally increase their supply of labor to the market at any given 
wage.   Since landlords are the largest (and in our constructed case, the only) net 
employer of wage labor this benefits them by increasing profits.  In short, the exercise of 
monopoly power over land also creates monopsony rents from labor.    
Viewed slightly differently, landlords strategy is to push down the land to labor ratio 
on peasant farms to lower their wage bill and at the same time raise land rents.  The one 
thing limiting how far this strategy can be pushed is that there is a cost to running 
inefficiently large and land-intensive farms because of their fixed holding of the non-
traded factor S.  Landlords will expand the size of their farms up to the point where the 
marginal gain from earning higher monopoly rents on land and/or monopsony rents from 
labor equals the marginal increase in this cost.   
The dashed line running through point D in figure 2 shows total income in the 
distorted economy at different levels of initial land inequality under the assumption that 
the two landlords perfectly collude.  The line passing through V in figure 2 indicates the 
level of peasant sector income in the post-abolition distorted economy.  Peasant incomes 
remain well below their competitive market potential and scarcely above what they 
earned in their serf-like existence.  Note that at higher levels of inequality θ, where 
landlords find it easier to exercise market power, the market distortion becomes even 
more pronounced.  The gain to the peasant sector from a ban on voluntary or involuntary 
tied labor-service tenancy is smaller in an economy where peasants have few property 
claims to land, as landlords can then easily find ‘market’ mechanisms to compel their 
labor at low cost.      
Taking stock of the argument so far, the model can be used to demonstrate that 
although it may be individually rational for a peasant to accept a tied contract when all 
other peasants have entered into similar contracts (their payoff can be raised from A to 
some small amount above A), paradoxically a general ban on all tied contracts can raise 
peasant wages and incomes.  Peasant welfare gain can be as large as moving from A to C 
if the ban leads to a new fully competitive equilibrium, but the gain is likely to fall 
considerably short of this if landlords react with new distorted allocations to extract rents.  
Peasant welfare then rises only from A to V.   Landlord income and total output falls if 
 25
the ban leads to a new distorted equilibrium.  Although we have argued that peasant 
income rises, it is not too hard to imagine situations where peasant welfare could actually 
end up falling if the landlord reaction extended to include extra-economic measures such 
as those described above and by Ransom and Sutch, or if as described below it creates 
new property rights conflicts over land.   
The model offers a plausible alternative or complementary explanation to why 
output should fall following abolition that is different from Fogel and Engerman’s (1974) 
explanation that it was because coerced labor produced more output per hour than free 
workers.  The model shows that the size of the distortions, and therefore the size of the 
output collapse and peasant welfare following emancipation are affected by several 
factors including the initial distribution of property rights over land, the ability of elites to 
collude and peasants to organize, and the role of non-traded factor S.    
Consider further the role of land inequality.  While the efficient way to produce 100 
units in our numerical example was to allocate 80 percent of total production to peasant 
farms and the remaining 20 percent to landlords, simple simulations for our benchmark 
parameters show landlord farms expanding to account for more than 50 percent of output 
by at θ = 0.8 and expanding ever more rapidly at higher levels.  As one increases θ to 
higher and higher levels tenancy suppression becomes more active until the point where 
(at around θ=0.87) landlords find it optimal to close down the tenancy market 
completely.  At this point landlords have already decided that they earn more from 
monopsony rents on labor (they’ve pushed the market wage far below the marginal 
product of a hired laborer) that they feel free to simply ignore land rent earnings 
(Conning 2004).  
At yet higher levels of initial land concentration θ  simulations show that landlords 
will actually start to encroach on peasant lands via reverse tenancy – large landlords will 
be observed hiring in land from small minifundistas.  This behavior may make sense in a 
model where we have assumed that peasant property rights to land are scrupulously 
protected by the state, since landlords then only have markets to use as a strategy to 
manipulate factor prices and obtain the land they desire.  In more realistic contexts, where 
property rights cannot be assumed to be costlessly enforced by a third party one is likely 
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to instead see the flaring up of conflict, for example land-hungry peasants squatting on 
landlord farms and common lands, or perhaps landlords hiring thugs not only to drive off 
squatters but also to restrict peasant access to frontier lands or off village lands.16  One 
might interpret the drive to enclose common lands as responding in part to a similar logic.   
The discussion suggests that an ‘American road’ trajectory, with active tenancy 
markets and prosperous family farmers is likely to take root only following emancipation 
or the opening of a new frontier where land is distributed in a more egalitarian fashion (θ 
is low).  A more distorted ‘Prussian Road’ such as that followed in Russia, Prussia, and 
many parts of Latin America is quite likely when initial land inequality is high.   
Recasting debates 
The freedom to sell labor is a touchstone of classical liberal philosophy.  Social 
conservatives and libertarians agree on this, even as they disagree over the value of 
freedom to decide what to do with one’s leisure time.  By contrast, some modern liberals 
question whether certain contracts to sell labor should be regarded as inviolable 
privileges of personal freedom.  Perhaps some kinds of freedom result in unfreedom. 
Some kinds of trade liberalization, it has been argued, may render a people worse off 
(Deardorff 1997). And democratic triumph by an undemocratic party may destroy a 
democracy.  Clearly, constructing models or hypotheticals of exceptions to a basic 
intuition is a perilous pursuit.  Special interests are always seeking justifications for anti-
liberal restrictions on freedom.  One thinks, for example, of the many restrictions on 
women’s employment that favored male union workers (Goldin 1988, 1991). In the 
political domain, a stance of refusing to grant exceptions to the principle of freedom of 
contract may be a healthy strategy. 
 But in very poor countries people are living generation after generation in 
miserable drudgery and early death. Asset inequality is high political and economic 
power is often locally concentrated. These human beings, and the economies they inhabit, 
are of special interest.  Might an otherwise healthy political strategy render disservice to 
the very poor and newly free?  Sometimes former slaves, serfs and bonded laborers have 
been emancipated into a daunting world of freedom of contract.  Exceptions to the 
intuition of the desirability of freedom to contract labor matter more for them.  Models 
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and hypotheticals demand careful attention rather than cavalier dismissal; it is vital to 
think carefully about whether a poor laborer should be allowed or forbidden to accept a 
contract to bond his labor for a decade to an employer.  
 Models that analyze the choices that people make when they are free to buy and 
sell labor presuppose a broader account of the determinants of self-ownership and control 
over earnings of others.  A model of an agrarian economy, examined in this chapter, 
reveals that enslavement and voluntary contracting may be thought of as possibilities 
along a continuum of strategies, and discerning that continuum of strategies is especially 
relevant when understanding the welfare of laborers following their emancipation from 
unfree arrangements.  Several factors may determine which strategies might be chosen; 
among them are the overall ratio of land to labor, the concentration of land holdings, the 
ease of collusion, the importance of non-tradable skill or managerial talent, the role 
played by outsiders and the state and other political factors.   
 We argued that a large variety of institutional settings can arise out of the 
interactions of landlords and peasants as the ratio of land to labor changes.  Because of 
this, it may not be the case that liberating formerly coerced laborers always unleashes 
their productive potential so that economies grow over time.   Moreover, it may be the 
case that there may at times be good reasons to regulate the freedom of contract.    
Prohibiting a landlord and a peasant from contracting would appear to stand in the way of 
gains from trade.  Yet in a purely competitive market there is no need for tied contracts.  
Landlords use tying as a way to control laborers’ outside opportunities.  A prohibition on 
tying may result in less efficient collusion, but delivers a greater share of the lower output 
to the hands of the laborers.  
This is another example of the general theory of the second-best that is well-used 
in economics: since labor markets may not be competitive and may have considerable 
moral hazard, and many other markets (i.e. for insurance) may not be perfect, then 
government regulation of voluntary contracts may improve general well-being or 
redistribute well-being in socially desirable ways.  Stopping one household from using 
bonding or child labor worsens their welfare but a uniform ban on bonded labor contracts 
(Genicot 2002) or child labor produces general equilibrium effects that may lead to a 
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better equilibrium (Basu 1999; Baland and Robinson 2000).  Our explanation is related, 
yet in an important sense also different from these other accounts. They focus on 
externalities on labor and/or credit markets and the role of public policy in helping to 
solve the coordination failure that may stops society from choosing a better equilibrium 
of the multiple available.  Our account focuses on the strategic action of local power 
holders to limit the outside opportunities of laborers. Society must overcome not just a 
coordination problem but also challenge local power structures to raise peasant welfare 
closer to its competitive level. 
The discussion of an exception to the intuition that free contracts are invariably 
socially desirable should not make one sanguine about public policy.  Governments are 
more likely to be handmaids of welfare worsening institutions regulating labor relations, 
as in Russia where the state prevented serfs from changing employers.  
The analysis of freedom and contracting in the context of labor must proceed 
dialectically, asking how an initial distribution of freedom generates a pattern of 
contracts, and how this pattern might then change subsequent distributions of freedom.  A 
famine might induce many laborers to willingly become serfs; their serf status may drive 
down the wage in the normal, non-famine economy, inducing still more laborers to enter 
serfdom.   An expanding frontier might induce laborers to leave their ancestral homes and 
employers in search of higher returns.  Their former employers might respond to the 
rising cost of labor by using force or collusion to limit the opportunities available to 
laborers, and extra-economic coercion and anti-competitive labor-tying might emerge as 
a reprehensible strategy in these circumstances.  The limited freedom of laborers that 
comes from enslavement is however not necessarily the best choice for employers, who 
may occasionally find that less aggressive tactics garner greater returns.   So the bright 
line between involuntary and voluntary labor arrangements is better redrawn as 
continuous shading. 
Appendix 
Here we provide some additional details and derivations.  The reader is referred to 
Conning (2004) for a more detailed and general presentation of the problem.     
 
Efficient competitive equilibrium 
In an efficient equilibrium the marginal value product of each factor must be equalized 
across farms.  If ( , )e ep pT L  is the equilibrium level of land and labor on a peasant farm then 
efficient landlord farm inputs must be ( , ) ( , )e e e er r r p r pT L S T S L=  since landlords use the same 
technology and have Sr times more of the non-traded factor.  Factor market balance 
requires 
   and   e e e er p p r p pM S L N L L M S T N T T⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ = ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ =  
from which we obtained expressions (0.1)-(0.2) for factor use ( , ) ( ,1)e ep pT L t= .  
Peasant output is then   ( ,1,1)pq F t t
α⎡ ⎤= = ⎣ ⎦  and equilibrium factor prices are  
 
1
( ,1) ( ,1)L Tw F t t and r F t t
α αβ α −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= = = =⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  
At 1t =  we have 1pq = , 0.45w β= = and 0.45r α= = .  The shadow price of a unit of 
the non-traded factor S, which is also the value of peasant farm profits, is 
(1 ) t
απ α β ⎡ ⎤= − − ⎣ ⎦ , which is 0.1 for our parameters. 
The slave economy  
If 40 peasant households are enslaved and the other 40 remain free, equilibrium 
production must now takes place on two landlord and 40 peasant farms.  Given the 
distribution of S, we must have 10s sr pT T=  and 10s sr pL L=  and land market equilibrium 
now requires 
2 10 40
10
60 6
s s
p p
s
p
T T T
TT t
⋅ + =
= =
 
A similar calculation using the labor market equilibrium equation reveals that 
10 / 6 1.67spL = = .  The institution of slavery blocks 40 households from becoming direct 
producers which then makes room for each of the remaining farm units to expand 
approximately 67 percent compared to the equilibrium without slavery.  Wage rates and 
rentals must fall as slaves’ non-traded farming skills are no longer being utilized as in the 
competitive economy.  
The market-power distorted economy when landlords cannot use tied contracts 
When tying is not allowed landlords must transact hire in labor at a ‘market’ wage w and 
land rental rate r.  A ‘landlord cartel’ would however collude to distort resource 
allocations to manipulate prices to their advantage.  They would act to choose factor use 
on the typical landlord farm ( , )r rT L  to maximize  
 ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) /r r r r r r r r r rG T L r T L T w T L L r T L T Mθ⎡ ⎤− ⋅ − ⋅ +⎣ ⎦  
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where factor market prices ( , )L p pw F T L=  and ( , )T p pr F T L=  can be written as functions 
of landlords’ choices ( , )r rT L  because by the factor market balance equations 
/ /p rT T N MT N= −  and / /p rL L N ML N= − .  In short market factor prices are 
determined by the marginal product of factors on peasant farms, but these can be 
manipulated because landlords’ internalize how their own production choices affect the 
availability of land to the peasant sector.  The pair of equations that make up the first-
order conditions for this problem are highly non-linear but the optimal solution to 
maximize landlord cartel income are easily found numerically for given parameter 
values, as discussed in the text. 
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Figure 1:  Landlord Sector Income as a function of the land-labor ratio,  Free Markets vs. Slavery 
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Figure 2: Total & Peasant sector income under different regimes 
(as a function of initial land inequality, θ) 
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 Endnotes 
 
                                                 
1 The presentation builds upon and extends Conning (2004). 
2  The observation that GDP per capita fell in post-emancipation societies including the US South, Brazil 
and sugar economies of the Caribbean is a widely noted and largely accepted empirical fact (Bush 2000; de 
Castro 2000).  Fogel and Engerman (1974) argued that the dietary and health well-being of slaves in the US 
South may have been comparable or along certain material dimensions even superior to that of 
contemporary free laborers.   
3 We’ve chosen Sr such that rMS N L+ = . This is without loss of generality, and mainly a convenient 
normalization to help simplify later expressions. 
4 The parameters are as described so far in the text and w = 0.45, the free labor market wage when 1t = . 
Raising w simply raises the costs of owning each slave, lowering landlord income in the slave economy and 
therefore raising the cutoff level of t  above which slavery becomes financially more lucrative. 
5 A large literature has debated this latter question.  Adam Smith and many abolitionists often argued that 
slave labor was by its very nature less efficient than free labor because a slave who could not own and 
accumulate property would have less incentive to supply quality labor.  Fogel and Engerman (1974) have 
argued however that slave labor in the antebellum South produced more output per worker than free labor 
because of the extra labor and ‘economies of scale’ that they argue could be achieved under a coercive 
gang labor system.  Although David and Temin (1979) and others have criticized their methods, the 
dominant view amongst economic historians seems to be that American slavery was on the whole a 
profitable institution to slaveowners at the time of its abolition (Kolchin 2003).  The model can be easily 
adapted to either assumption. 
6 If slave owners could extract sufficiently more output per worker from a slave compared to a free man 
through coercion then total measured output could fall following the abolition of slavery, the explanation 
suggested by Fogel and Engerman (1974).  Without denying that this effect could have been at work, we 
shall suggest an alternative explanation.    
7 Transacting with other peasants who have not accepted landlord contracts offers no better alternative over 
this reservation payoff, since we have assumed these other peasants have the exact same endowment. 
Throughout this discussion we continue to assume that 100T L= = , θ=0.8 and all other parameters are as 
described above. 
8 The solution is not to extend a larger tenancy to the laborer and extract rents through a higher lump-sum 
tribute payment because this would fail to fully utilize the landlords’ own farming skill S. 
9 We are well aware, of course, of a large literature that makes clear that ex-ante commitments to limit an 
agent’s outside opportunities may be Pareto-improving to both landlord and peasant in many moral hazard 
contexts (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1990; Braverman and Stiglitz 1982).  Virtually all of this literature 
starts however from the partial-equilibrium, bilateral contracting approach that takes agents’ reservation 
payoffs as given, and therefore ignores the primary focus of our analysis here: how contracts terms may 
affect those reservation payoffs in general equilibrium.  
10 Kliuchevsky underscores how landlords used the legal device of debt bonding to tie down their workers, 
for instance by converting practically all the remainng servants who had previously worked for wages and 
without promissory notes into bondsmen.  The terms of bondsmen’s contracts also became more and more 
onerous as time passed, adding clauses in which bondsmen had to for example agree to “live as a peasant 
under my master for the rest of my life and not run away anywhere,” and which obliged the peasant to now 
pay damages on top of his debt for leaving.   
11 Modern economic theories such as the theory of indefinitely repeated games with reputational equilibria 
(Kandori 1992), models of asymmetric information and stigma (Akerlof 1976), or evolutionary game 
theory and agent-based analysis of social dynamics (Durlauf and Young 2004) have provided solid micro-
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foundations upon which to explain the emergence and persistence of collusive arrangements and 
discriminatory norms might be sustained over long periods of time. 
12 Recall that the efficient competitive equilibrium had w=r=0.45.  Total imputed income from the peasant 
sectors’ ownership of 20 units of land is therefore 9=0.45*20, their income from owning 100 units of labor 
is 45=.45*100, and total farm profits (or returns to the non-traded S) from the 80 peasant farms equals 
8=0.1*80.  This sums to 62. 
13 For example de Janvry (1981) discusses some of the 20th century legislation in Chile and other Latin 
American countries that required landowners to pay agricultural labor in cash rather than kind as well as 
enforcing minimum agricultural wage laws. 
14 In this sense the model offers microfoundations to help explain the pattern of elite behavior described by 
Ransom and Sutch and others, by providing a framework within which to identify and quantify the costs 
and rewards elites stood to gain via political and economic actions.  It also offers a microeconomic 
explanation for the kind of inverse relationship between asset inequality and political and economic 
outcomes that Engerman and Sokoloff (2000) and others have identified in explaining the divergent growth 
paths of regions.  
15 Similar results, albeit in somewhat more muted form, emerge if we instead model landlord interaction as 
a non-cooperative Cournot game Conning (2004).   
16 Conning and Robinson (2005) explore a related model that shows how endogenously determined 
property rights conflicts would further suppress the operation of market for tenancies. 
